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Many central banks in both developed and developing countries 
target low inflation rates, either explicitly or implicitly. They believe that 
inflation results from a monetary excess, driven by domestic fiscal deficits. So 
they respond to rising inflation by hiking the rate of interest, expecting thereby 
to dampen aggregate demand and inflation expectations.
Yet much of the recent rise in inflation in both developed and developing 
countries has not been driven by domestic factors, but by international factors 
beyond the control of national policymakers. As global trade and capital flows 
have become more integrated, inflation has become increasingly ‘globalised’. 
This trend has heightened the risk of misguided national policy responses, 
especially since monetarism still dominates the mindset of most central 
bankers. Because of the sharply rising risk of financial crisis and recession 
in developed countries and an associated marked slowdown of growth in 
developing countries, a tightening of monetary policies now would only make 
matters much worse.
Rising Food and Oil Prices
The immediately recognizable causes of inflation (as well as price volatility) 
have been the coincident increases in food and oil prices. Inflation-adjusted 
oil prices rose from about US$ 32 per barrel on average in 2003 to about US$ 
66 on average in 2007 and then peaked at over US$ 140 by June 2008 before 
declining significantly since then. After 2006, the world prices of rice, wheat 
and maize rose dramatically—i.e., by over 200 per cent, over 130 per cent and 
about 125 per cent, respectively.
Despite recent drops, the prices of both oil and food are likely to remain high 
in real terms for a while. Oil prices will depend, for example, on how demand 
responds to a global deceleration of growth. Proven reserves have already 
peaked and the supply response is likely to be weak. 
Such global price shocks have translated into an ‘imported’ acceleration of 
inflation for many countries. Countries that are net food or oil importers, 
especially low-income countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique 
and Senegal, are suffering the most.
The long-term problem is that global supply has not kept up with rising global 
demand for food and oil. There are a number of causes. For food prices, they 
range from droughts to higher energy and fertilizer prices to diversion by the 
US and EU of land and feed stocks to bio-fuels. Heightened speculation by 
international investors has compounded the recent increases in prices, and 
their volatility.
`
But an underlying structural factor, particularly in developing countries, has 
been long-standing underinvestment in agriculture. The mistaken advice 
of multilateral and regional financial institutions is partly to blame. The 
woeful lack of both public and private investment in agriculture will only 
be aggravated if central banks in developing countries now resort to higher 
interest rates. 
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Who Is Importing Oil?
A common explanation for rising oil prices is the intensifying demand for oil from the 
rapidly growing economies of China and India. But this focus on marginal trends is 
misleading. The US is, by far, the world’s largest oil consumer, and has been on a binge 
since the early 1990s.
In addition to producing about 300 million tons of oil, the US imported 582 million 
tons of crude oil in 2005, 26 per cent of the world total (see Table). Japan, the second 
largest importer, accounted for 213 million tons, i.e., over nine per cent. Together, the 
EU countries of Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands and Spain imported 413 million 
tons, or 18 per cent of the total. In contrast, China imported 127 million tons and India 
99 million tons. Together, they accounted for only one tenth of the total. 
Largest Importers Million Tons
United States 582
Japan 213
China 127
Korea, Rep. of 115
Germany 112
India 99
Italy 95
France 84
Netherlands 62
Spain 60
Rest of World 709
World 2258
Because its domestic oil production has been falling, the US is under increasing 
pressure to secure global supplies. But until recently, historically low real prices of oil 
on the world market have constrained investment. Moreover, existing reserves have 
proven increasingly more expensive to exploit.
Despite its consumption binge and mammoth current account deficit, the US has not 
responded to global inflationary pressures with high interest rates. On the contrary, 
the US Federal Reserve loosened monetary policies in 2007 in order to stave off an 
impending financial meltdown and the US Government followed suit by loosening 
fiscal policies. 
Although food and oil prices are likely to remain high for some time, an intensifying 
‘globalized’ credit crunch could lead eventually to general disinflation. Should 
developing countries therefore be required now to shoulder the burden of fighting 
globally generated inflation by raising policy interest rates and inducing their own 
domestic recessions? In the current global context, this is misguided monetarism run 
amok.
                                    
      
